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rather than BDM. Also missed is the value of democratic and interactive communications, meaning that
the BDM Set Top Boxes (STBs) are seen merely as decoders of one-way content flows. In sum, the
experience of BDM as a particular intersection of communications technology and social conditions
reflects an inadequate African communication theorisation .
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Theorising African communications: the bad news signalled by broadcast digital
migration policy.
Abstract:
Broadcasting digital migration (BDM) in Africa reflects deadlines agreed by the
continent at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The case suggests a
negative answer to the question about a uniquely African contribution to
communication theory. This is because there is a disjuncture between the ideology
of BDM, as evolved in developed countries and copied in African countries, and a
critical theorisation of African communications which could surface a different
vantage point.
The embedded theory that informs African accord on BDM assumes unquestioningly
that this particular development in advanced economies has to be emulated in
Africa. As a result, primary African communications characteristics are ignored,
including the case for investing in radio or mobile internet rather than BDM. Also
missed is the value of democratic and interactive communications, meaning that the
BDM Set Top Boxes (STBs) are seen merely as decoders of one-way content flows.
In sum, the experience of BDM as a particular intersection of communications
technology and social conditions reflects an inadequate African communication
theorisation.
Keywords: Digital migration, Set Top Box, Internet, Democracy, Africanisation
1. Introduction and Definitions
The notion of an “African theory of communications” suggests a distinctive body of
abstract propositions about a particular dimension of human activity (in this case,
communication). This is not a “mere” application of another theory to the field, such
as a political economy application, or a normative-centric application. It implies,
rather that there should be an original, coherent and stand-alone system, linked to a
particular locality, even if drawing in part (and inevitably) from theories peculiar to
other continents. The quest for such a conceptual tool-set arises from the belief, as
expressed by Obonyo (2011), that it is difficult “to universally apply to Africa theories
of communication that have been developed within the context of liberal pluralism”.
That perspective in turn rests upon a (questionable) belief about the coherence of an
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object called “Africa”, based on commonalities within such a locality, and it further
assumes that this object is not liberal democratic in context. These assumptions hold
whether “Africa” is construed as a sub-Saharan cultural identity or a purely
geographic one.
The complexity in what is sketched above makes it hard to see how such an
ambitious undertaking as “an African theory of communication” could be met – and
similarly, why there is limited scholarship attempting to advance such an endeavour.
Accordingly, the idea of trying to develop a “grand” theory that amounts to an
“African theory” should probably best be set aside. A more modest quest can be
postulated: i.e. to see to what extent the varied conditions in sub-Saharan Africa can
sustain a theoretical proposition of abstractions and generalisations that can then be
appropriately applied to analysis within (at least some) contexts. Such application
would not be a matter of setting up an “idealised” theory of “African communications”
and then measuring whether empirical realities correspond to or deviate from it. That
kind of exercise would only describe greater or lesser shortfalls or fulfilments,
whereas the point of theory should instead be to help illuminate and explain
relationships in what is (see Berger, 2002).
The challenge then is to examine a number of communications-relevant conditions
that are common in much of sub-Saharan Africa, with a view to establishing
connections and patterns that may in turn lead to a number of theoretical
propositions for subsequent application to an empirical case. This is not likely to
generate uniquely continent-relevant “African” knowledge, let alone count as an
“African theory”, as much as a constituting only a far-less-grand set of criteria that
could be relevant to analysing communications initiatives in the region. The
methodology involved is akin to Marx’s development of his theory of capital. It is a
movement that starts from the particular, moves to the general, and then utilises this
general level to make an assessment of particular instances.
More concretely, in this paper, the approach will thus be first to highlight a number of
phenomena evident in many African communications landscapes; second to
extrapolate their significance into a more abstract set of general propositions about
relationships and interdependencies; and third, to then use these to analyse
broadcast digital migration (BDM) issues within selected African instances.
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Before this, however, it is important to underline what is meant by “communications”
– a notion that needs unpacking, just as “African” and “theory” do. Although
communications and information are often conflated, and although much mass
media engages in the latter and not the former, the task of trying to theorise and then
analyse “communications” is different to doing the same as regards “information”. To
clarify conceptually, information is the currency of communication, yet to inform
someone does not require communication in the to-and-fro flow sense that the term
conveys, as Raymond Williams pointed out many decades ago. It follows from this
distinction that a media-dense society is not necessarily a communication-rich
society: information may flow through the mass media, but in a one-way direction. In
this way, theorising communications (in Africa as elsewhere) is a wider endeavour
than theorising information or media. On the other hand, mass communications via
the media, even in the form of highly imbalanced information flows between sender
and receiver, should not be side-lined. What this means for this paper, therefore, is
that the focus will be on communications contexts within which the mass media can
then be located.
Against this background, a number of salient phenomena can be observed in regard
to empirical information about communications in many sub-Saharan African
countries. These general observations allow for a degree of theorisation that can
subsequently contribute to analysis of a phenomenon like BDM.
i.

Most people in the region relied on oral media prior to colonialism, and wordof-mouth remains a major form of not just information transmission, but also
the direct interaction that is often characteristic of communication (as distinct
from information). In the nature of the medium, it pre-empts the distancing of
participants which can more easily occur when information is “mediated” via a
“third-party mechanism” – often thereby separating sender and receivers from
the possibility of direct and immediate dialogue. Word-of-mouth thus not only
obviates a need for literacy, it also lends itself more to communication more
than does a mass-mediated flow of information, although one should not
ignore social limitations that compel children or women to listen rather than to
initiate conversation, to question or respond. Nevertheless, much of the
information in circulation (or in storage) in Africa is still reliant on face-to-face
voice interactions (and human memory), and one can reasonably posit that
3

this constitutes, proportionately, a far greater share of the total, than is the
case in more media-dense parts of the world. (See Bourgault, 1995).
ii.

Significantly, what mass media technology exists in sub-Saharan Africa is
largely imported, along with many genres and media roles (see Golding,
1997; Mwesige, 2004; Kanyegerire 2008). The technology therefore has
been a vector for dependent linkage to external sources, and styles, of
information generation and distribution.

iii.

Colonialism in various forms characterised and shaped the constitution of
nation-states (and national media systems) on the continent, as well as many
of its international, economic, political and legal relationships. Although the
specifics and their legacy are diverse, at a more general level many Africans
have a shared experience of external domination, racism and exploitation
(and slavery in many instances), some of which persist in what is described
as neo-colonial characteristics. In the field of communications, it can be
posited that there are two rival approaches that are related to this history –
liberal pluralism vs developmentalism. The first stresses media independence
of government, the second highlights the role of the state in regard to society
at large and media in particular. Although these approaches achieved
formulation elsewhere in the world (for example in the Anglophone vs
Francophone press traditions, and also in regard to the US vs European
broadcast traditions), and percolated into Africa, they also each have
endogamous drivers and resonances amongst African media practitioners,
politicians and scholars. It can further be noted that they both also share an
underlying assumption of normative voluntarism – that a given media system
is the result of what a society has chosen. Indeed, the notion that “the role of
the media” (or the role of communications) is a matter of debate and
selection, can arguably be traced to a particular (even hegemonic) strand of
Western scholarship and ideology based on conceptions of functionalist
consensus. The recognition that there are determinants and constraints
related to power, political economy, technology, literacy, etc., often exists in a
distant paradigm - even if in many ways this alternative conceptualisation
provides greater insight into the empirical realities of communication
anywhere, than does a normative focus. In some respects, African media and
communications more widely operate within a tug-of-war between various
4

“normative” pulls on the one hand, and diverse “materialist” pushes on the
other.
iv.

The sub-Saharan Africa region and its history means that it is characterised
by enormous pluri-lingualism on the one hand, and one or two (usually
colonial) languages of power on the other. Many people are multilingual, even
though this can pale in the face of the extent of linguistic variation in a given
country or sub-region. The implications for cross-communication are
substantial, as they are for the size of markets for minority language content.

v.

Economic, social and educational inequalities are very high, with the majority
of Africans being located on the deprived side of the scale. This has
implications for the cost, literacy and time required to engage with mass
communication. It also emphasises that media markets in Africa are limited by
audience poverty and an owner lack of capital in addition to the common
problem of infrastructural underdevelopment and collapse. One consequence
is that sub-Saharan Africa sometimes attracts the label of being an
“information desert” from the point of view of the broader public that endures
widespread “information poverty”, although the elites do have access to
communications technologies and international content on a par with
developed countries. On the other hand, many Africans have valuable
information resources gleaned from history and experience, and many have
also proved tenacious in developing and appropriating media tools, and in
creating media companies, to fulfil various purposes – some narrowly political
or cultural/linguistic, others primarily profit-driven and a number motivated by
concepts of public service. In other words, the African communications
environment is not one of passive victims and ignorant vessels awaiting
fulfilment, although it is also evident that there is a relative dearth of local
content in much media, especially TV.

vi.

The demographics of the region entail a young population, primarily nonnuclear families, and large and scattered rural populations. These factors can
militate against mass communications uptake. At a cultural level, many
Africans practice hybridized cultures that both draw upon past traditions and
at the same time mesh these with imported notions and artefacts. This is
evident regarding issues like mixtures of cultural belief and practice regarding
individualism vs communitarianism, women’s status, sexual orientations, the
5

significance of age, the role of gifts, attitudes to authority and leadership
styles (a point made by Obonyo, 2011), spiritual and health care, music and
dance, etc.
vii.

Only a minority of countries in Africa are democracies and the media freedom
dispensation appears to have actually declined over the past decade (Berger,
2011a). Control and repression of mass communications via the media has
played its part in preventing the industry from reaching its wider potential.
Corresponding to top-down and despotic rule, media is widely treated as a
tool by the powerful who have little interest in dialogue with subject
populations. While state power in much of Africa is successfully abused by
rulers to stay in power – and this includes deployment of state-owned media
(often the largest component within the media sector), in other respects
dysfunctionality is the order of the day. This latter feature impacts on the
infrastructure for media (such as electricity), as well as on state provision of
education, with the knock-on effect that universities are under-resourced and
lacking in research capacity and output – not least in regard to the
communications field which is scanty in regard to scholarship on African
conditions.

Against this backdrop, it can be stated that, at a general level, the media component
of the African communications landscape is dependent and hybridised, often
oriented towards a major colonial language and metropole rather than internally, and
difficult to develop in the face of unfavourable economic and political conditions. It is
the object of major political contest and control, and it operates in a unidirectional
rather than interactive mode.
The seven features identified above can be summarised as: prevalence of word-ofmouth communications, imported technologies and genres, colonial legacy
approaches to media roles, pluri-lingualism, social inequality, particular
demographics, and political repression. These complement each other in varying
combinations in particular African countries, creating a whole which is difficult to
transform. An effect therefore is that media enterprises are generally limited in size
and range, as is their role, with the consequence that only limited quantities of
information are generated. These enterprises, due to the politics of control, are also
6

more likely to concentrate on information (or in many cases, misinformation), rather
than communication as such. The public sphere in African countries is thus often
exemplified by polarised media, akin to the Mediterranean model (Hallin and
Mancini, 2004) – although pluralism in broadcasting has been deliberately
constrained by many governments who retain control of such an important
informational apparatus.
These broad abstracted propositions do not amount to a theory as such, but it can
be posited that the issues and interdependences that are highlighted are sufficiently
widespread as to require that a strategy such as BDM should be assessed with
regard to the complex and variegated totality of these features. Regrettably, this is
exactly what has not happened.
2. Broadcasting in the African media landscape
This is not the place to review the history of African broadcasting, except to highlight
the instrumentalist and informational approach that has characterised the
deployment of this medium since colonial days (see Head, 1974; Mytton, 1983,
Salama, 1989; Paterson, 1998; Article 19, 2003; Panos, 2006). Even liberation radio
has had a similar character, meaning that broadcasting organisations have generally
not been recognised as deserving of autonomy. The normative perspective of
developmentalism, linked to control and a state-driven structure, is alive - if not very
well - in regard to what constitutes the dominant broadcast network in very many
sub-Saharan African countries: i.e. the state-owned broadcast industry (see
broadcast reports at www.afrimap.org). At the same time, in those limited cases
where the repressive “lid” has been lifted, extra-state broadcasters have flourished,
especially in radio, as in the DRC, Uganda and Tanzania (see AMDI, 2007).
Generally, however, broadcasting has kept its character shaped by its unidirectional
history. Talk radio, given impetus by cellphone dissemination and access, has begun
to initiate a new understanding of broadcasting, but this perspective has not
extensively taken hold in other forms of radio, nor in TV. The result is that
broadcasting continues to largely be seen – by senders as well as receivers – as an
informational, rather than communicational, medium. Despite its apparent similarity
with interpersonal word-of-mouth communication, it generally lacks interaction and
sender-receiver conversation.
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The strengths of broadcasting – in terms of reliance only on sound or video – and the
capacity of the medium to transcend distances, are one reason why this medium has
come to achieve greatest reach in African conditions (though by no means
universal). This is even although cellphones are now becoming very widespread as
well (and one should also note that these devices are still at present mainly used as
interpersonal rather than mass communication devices). Broadcasting is also able to
accommodate diverse languages and ages on different stations, channels and
programmes; accord with people’s interests in cultural hybridisation; and remain
generally free-to-air for the audience. In this way, broadcasting constitutes a “best fit”
medium in sub-Saharan Africa. One qualification, however, is electrical power which
is hugely problematic in most countries in the region. In this regard, radio is more
easily powered by portable batteries than TV. In addition, signal distribution for radio
is a less expensive (and often more local) endeavour, than it is for TV. As a result,
TV in sub-Saharan Africa is primarily an urban phenomenon, apart from subscription
satellite TV (which itself is only available to the elite). In addition, it should be noted
that the production of content for TV is generally more expensive than radio, and the
same applies even to the acquisition of imported content. Besides for regulatory
conservatism which limits TV licencing in many African countries, these costs are
probably the next big inhibitor of this medium. In a word, radio is what deserves
policy attention, investment, development and research in Africa as the pre-eminent
mass-media platform within the wider information and communications ecology.
Into this context, BDM has come. It applies, however, to TV – not to radio (at least
not for the next decade). And it comes with a huge price related to conversion of
production, transmission and reception (see Berger, 2006). This is not just an
inexorable advance of technology, but a phenomenon that has been consciously
constructed at the international level – and in particular in Geneva under the
auspices of the ITU. In 2006, members of this body agreed a treaty which declared
that 2015 would be the cut-off point for analogue TV broadcasting in the EuropeanAfrican region of the world. It is a little known fact that a full 30 of Africa’s 54 states
are actually given up till 2020 in the same treaty – i.e. almost two-thirds of the
continent (see Berger, 2010b). Even so, most African states have formally committed
to trying to reach the milestone even before 2015, notwithstanding the extreme
likelihood that such a goal is about as illusory as Muammar Gaddafi’s United States
8

of Africa. What is also little discussed is what consequences will befall a country that
fails to meet the deadline. Instead, misunderstanding is evident. For example,
Uganda Communications Commission Executive Director, Godfrey Mutabazi,
claimed in 2011 that the country’s failures around BDM were “bound to leave
Uganda without television as the rest of the world goes digital by 2015” (Imaka,
2011). In fact, the consequences of missing ITU deadlines are merely that this
international body will not help to protect analogue TV signals from interference from
neighbouring countries – something that is far from being a major problem in Africa.
It is easy to see how the reasons for BDM and its deadline make sense for Europe.
By switching from analogue to digital TV transmission, spectrum is freed up. Where
once an analogue channel took up a whole frequency, now up to 24 video channels
can ride on the same signal (via compression, and through a multiplex). Digital
quality allows for better reproduction and even HD TV channels – as long as the
audience has the requisite equipment. And, because the airwaves are being more
efficiently utilised, a “digital dividend” can be reaped that will allow for new TV
channels to be carried, and more spectrum to be released for wireless telecoms and
internet. This is good for ambitious TV and telecoms players in media-dense Europe,
and also for audiences there. It is also good for technology vendors who see a bright
market for either STBs to enable the digital signal to be viewed on an analogue TV
set, or for digital-ready TV sets (and HD versions of these sets).
What is not so easy to see is why any of this makes sense for Africa (Berger, 2010c).
Generally, the problem of limited numbers of TV channels in the sub-Saharan region
is a factor of regulatory restriction that seeks to protect state TV, and/or a factor of
weak business conditions related to limited advertising, a limited market for pay-TV,
and an absence of low-cost local content that would attract domestic viewers. The
advent of more TV opportunities via digital channels in Africa does not change these
material constraints. Likewise, African cellphone companies and wireless internet
service providers have learnt to “re-farm” their existing spectrum allocations, and are
not generally desperate for more spectrum. Lastly, there is barely a market for digital
ready TV sets outside of the tiny African elite. Similarly, the distances in Africa
suggest that digital satellite would be a better investment than digital terrestrial TV
which is what BDM refers to.

9

Arguments by Africans in favour of proceeding with BDM have neglected these
issues and focused instead on what amounts to the extensive hype about the
switchover. The benefits not only have very little traction in African conditions, but
have also been stressed without reference to balancing them with the costs. And
amongst the benefits, there has also been a great deal of disinformation – for
example, exaggerating the quality improvements of a picture (which is decoded from
digital to display on the analogue set), and allowing for subtitling in diverse
languages. There is widespread confusion that Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT)
equates to HD TV quality,1 which is by no means necessarily the case: most in fact
is both transmitted and viewed in Standard Definition. Analogue sets certainly cannot
show HD quality, not all digital sets can, and nor are all STBs necessarily HD-ready.
Most weak of all is the argument that “Africa” needs to go along with BDM because
the “rest of the world is doing so” (even though most Latin American countries are
targeting 2020). This argument falls squarely into a colonised mentality that goes
hand-in-hand with a modernisation understanding of global and national
development. In this, the name of the game is “catch-up”, and the fear of lagging.2 It
concentrates on a deficit view of Africa’s status in communications, instead of
examining what the internal strengths, needs and opportunities might be. The
massive resources required for BDM are thus unquestioningly seen as a necessary
expense for continuing to provide TV services, when they could be allocated to other
highly-meritorious communicational purposes – like radio development, support for
local content development and languages on analogue TV, extending transmission
of analogue TV signals, subsidies for community TV, conversion of state
broadcasting into public broadcasting, and satellite broadcast options – and not to

1

For example, the International Marketing Council of South Africa (2011) misunderstands as follows: “The
move will allow for high-definition (HD) television viewing, which produces a substantially higher image
resolution. HD television sets are already available on the local market, and those who own them, will not be
affected by the transition to the digital signal. But millions of poor South Africans still have the standarddefinition television sets. Their transition to digital television will be simplified by set top boxes, which will
make their sets compatible for HD viewing.”
2
In 2009, South African regulator Robert Nkuna speaking on BDM was reported as follows: “Currently, he said,
Africa lagged behind, but was optimistic that the continent would soon catch up with the rest of the world.”
(Udeorah, 2009). A Nigerian counterpart, Ernest Ndukwe a few years earlier stated: “As we strive to catch up
with the world, it is imperative that Nigeria is in tune with technological trends in this fast moving industry“.
(Ndukwe 2005) In 2011, another report read: “The international switch off date from analogue to digital
broadcasting is expected on June, 17, 2015, but African leaders met a few years ago and brought forward the
continent's deadline to 2012 so as to catch up with the world.” (Oluka, 2011).
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mention supporting Internet backbone development and subsidising Internet access
for schools, clinics, etc. (see Berger 2010a).
Where this unfortunate modernist view really runs into trouble is in regard to the
occasionally-expressed fear of Africa becoming a dumping ground for obsolete
analogue equipment (see Berger 2010a; CTO 2010). This arguably arises from a
sense of injured pride that, despite the formal ending of racist colonial control,
Africans risk being relegated to second-class citizen status and reliant on hand-medowns from other races. On the other hand, the import of second-hand analogue TV
sets from Europe can hardly be considered as keeping Africans condemned to use
backward technologies. This is because the primary BDM change in sub-Saharan
Africa will be in transmission, not in the TV set. Thus, STBs will become distributed
en masse in order to view digital signals on the continent’s existing analogue TV sets
– so more of these sets actually mean more opportunities for viewing even after
BDM is completed.
Finally, another argument sometimes made in favour of BDM in sub-Saharan Africa
is that this is a strategy to bridge the “digital divide”. The idea is that the STB will also
enable Internet access, and therefore e-governance (see Armstrong and Collins,
2011). This is something that exists in South African government policy, for example,
and it has also been expressed by a senior Namibian civil servant.3 But in practice,
this benefit is not being translated into the necessary technical specifications for
modems, memory, storage space, individual box addressability, keyboards, or open
application-programme-interfaces. Instead the boxes are basically decoders, rather
than being designed to serve as multi-purpose computers with the TV screen as
monitor and the remote control as a possible input device.
South African government experience has been to regard broadcast and internet
worlds as separate entities, requiring policies and implementing institutions that do
not overlap or intersect (Berger, 2011b). Although South African policy has been that
there should be protectionism for a local electronics industry to manufacture the
STBS, and in this sense there is a flicker of a “dependista” challenge to the
modernisation model of BDM, the paradigm still remains broadcast-centric and
3

Mbeuta Ua-Ndjarakana, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information, Communication and Technology,
speaking at conference to mark Namibia World Press Freedom Day, 2011 on 5 - 6 May 2011, Safari Court
Hotel, Windhoek, Namibia
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therefore unidirectional and informational, rather than communicational. The boxes,
in short, are likely to be assemblies of parts made elsewhere, with little thought about
what kinds of components and software would represent an original combination
which more properly addresses African communications problems and opportunities.
What this means is that BDM is being conceived primarily as a new way to deliver an
old information service. To the extent that there could be interactive communicational
benefits, this is mainly envisaged as a longer-term outcome of the digital dividend
facilitating the growth of wireless internet and telephony. What this misses is how
convergence can exist right at the heart of BDM itself. In particular, the STB could
not only receive and convert digital broadcast signals back to analogue, it could also
provide an interface with the Internet that allows users to send their own signals back
to the broadcaster, and to the wider Internet world. The notion of hybrid TV is
increasingly established in developed countries, where a single STB provides triple
play of internet access, digital TV access (by airwaves, and/or cable and/or satellite),
and telephony. But the significant enabling feature of this device is its inclusion of a
cable component which typically provides broadband Internet capability. The
absence of cable in most African environments has understandably meant that this
form of hybrid has not caught on in the region. However, hybridisation of the box, by
linking it to cellphone modem, is not too distant a notion from this configuration. But
there is one hitch – cellphone-based Internet, even carried by 3G, is unsuited to
video or even audio streaming, especially when the airwaves are congested. So
what’s an African to do, given that fibre connections to the home are not a realistic
prospect in most of the continent for many years to come?
The answer is that it is possible to consider a work-around: using 3G (via a STB inbuilt or plug-in modem) for uplink, and the digital TV signal for the downlink. This
requires hybridisation at the level of the 3G ISP and the digital broadcaster – an
interface at that point that will allow for this creative solution. In this scenario, instead
of digital broadcasters sitting with unused digital TV channels on their multiplexes,
they use that capacity for data delivery that is triggered by a user through 3G and
delivered to the STB for viewing on an analogue TV set. In this way, the STB is a
smart device linked in turn to a smart communications circuit. The result is a system
that is no longer confined to a unidirectional content flow paradigm, nor cramped
within the confines of a given broadcaster’s own content inventory. The entire online
12

universe becomes available to download – and to interact with and contribute
content to. The possibility thus exists for expanded user-generated content by
Africans to be produced and disseminated on a vast scale – spanning languages,
ages and cultures.
All this would not end information and communications inequality and deprivation in
Africa; nor would it eliminate the broadband digital divide for those outside the TVbroadband combo loop. But it would both piggyback upon and transform the nature
of TV as a significant medium on the continent. In this way, the solution could have a
bearing on repressive regimes, assuming at least that they do not insist on “dumb”
STB or erect walls between internet and broadcast industries.
3. Conclusion
To unfold this kind of vision of communications development for sub-Saharan Africa
is something beyond the mainstream paradigms which operate with broadcastinternet silos, and with assumptions about broadcasting as being about a
unidirectional information flow. Its inspiration arises, however, from engagement
with the context in which African media operate. It entails creative adaptation of the
unnecessary, but already advanced, importation of BDM. This is firstly by critically
analysing how understanding how this fits into a history of dependence. Secondly, it
entails examining predominant features of African communications – like the
continuing centrality of face-to-face communications and how broadcasting
replicates some of this (orality, visuality, language diversity), and how this loses the
interactive and dialogic character through its primarily uni-directional operation to
date. This new vision focuses on the material determinants that affect
communications, and still attempts to allow for choice and conscious direction to
develop a viable interactive media system even in the face of the limitations. In this
way, this perspective operates with a potential to go beyond the dichotomy of
communication as being about a negative concept of rights of liberal pluralism (rights
against the state) versus a concept of rights through the state. It is also a notion that
transcends states and which integrates Africans into a more global ecology of
communications possibilities.
The intellectual work in this paper does not constitute a new theory of African
communications, and much less an “African theory” of communications. But there
13

may be something in the way that this responds to local realities that nevertheless
has a wider relevance. It could be that if African countries could reinvent BDM to
make a really significant contribution to their communications conditions, that could
open eyes in other parts of the world. At least, however, it would help to change the
local communications systems along more democratic and participative lines. That
ultimately should be the measure of whether theorising African communications is
worth the effort.
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